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Religion and Rights in
Nineteenth-Century American
Law: Reflections on the Work
of Elizabeth B. Clark
by KRISTIN A. OlBERTSON*
The 150th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation has attracted scholarly and popular attention alike, but all this interest
seems to have generated more heat than light . Lincoln's intentions
and motivations, in particular, remain at least partly inscrutable.
Was he acting as a reformer, or a lawyer? Were his motivations primarily moral, or practical and strategic? What notion of freedom,
precisely, did he envision for freed African-Americans? This essay
does not seek to provide conclusive answersto these questions, but
it does suggest a fruitful place to begin an exploration of them . The
work of the late Elizabeth B. Clark analyzes antebellum reformers,
abolitionists in particular, and offers an important perspective on
how and why emancipation was ultimately achieved.
Elizabeth Clark's essays on early nineteenth-century reform
movements make a compelling casethat abolitionists and feminists
alike understood individual rights from a profoundly religious perspective. Clark also demonstrates how these reformers advocated
the protection of so-called "natural rights" for enslaved AfricanAmericans and white women in the vivid and fervently emotional
language of evangelical revivalism. Broader cultural and intellectual
trends of resistance to governmental and clerical authority, trends
rooted in liberal and evangelical Protestantism, Clark argues, helped
fuel attacks on slavery and gender inequality. Rejecting other historians' portrayals ofthe antebellum reformers as primarily secular
in orientation, Clark makes the arresting, and well-substantiated,
assertion that "For a time liberal religious thought became the primary carrier of notions of individual integrity critical to liberal
political theory." Antebellum reformers retrieved pre-Revolutionary

* Kristin A. Olbertson is Assistant Professor of History at Alma College, Alma,
M ichigan. I am grateful to Tom Green and Dirk Hartog for initially suggesting, unflaggingly supporting, and helpfully commenting on this project . Whatever flaws
remain are mine alone.
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language of natural rights and natural law and critiques of excessive
state power and resurrected a Reformation-era faith in the epistemological reliability of individual conscience and private judgment,
fusing them all into a set of "moral conventions" which "over time
. . . have become incorporated as a persistent strand in our rights
tradition," notably the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.1
The story of how religious-minded reformers rescued individual
rights, however, is not entirely straightforward. That is to say, once
antebellum reformers had formulated their "dynamic" vision of
bodily autonomy and its component rights, how did this vision become a vital force in the legal and constitutional life of the nation?
By Clark's own account, the abolitionist movement, and the early
women's and temperance movements, operated largely in direct
opposition to law. The right of self-ownership, for nineteenth-century reformers, was not limited to the "familiar possessive paradigm," but was "far more dynamic ... describing the ecology of
moral relations with others, and ultimately with God," and was
rooted in an individual's "spiritual nature and the conscience"-and
thus was implicitly not rooted in law or any sort of "self-evident"
truths, but in an individual's obligations to develop fully her divinelybestowed gifts. Individual rights in general were "individual" not in
reference to any Enlightenment-era sense of the liberal, autonomous
person, but by "identification with the right of private judgment"
and individual conscience. These reformers perceived themselves
as heirs of the Reformation, not the Revolution, in their opposition
to state policies regarding slavery. In fact, Clark reports, abolitionists
had little regard for the reformative capacity of law itself, and for
evangelical reformers, "the rejection of legalism served as a leitmotif in the struggle against Calvinism and slavery both." The institution of slavery (and as later reformers would point out, marriage),
after all, was a corrupt legal arrangement according to which the
state had privatized certain domestic relationships and their concomitant mechanisms of social ordering. Some anti-slavery activists
even discouraged their adherents from participating in the legal sys-

1 Elizabeth B. Clark, "The Sacred Rights of the Weak "; Pain, Sympathy, and the
Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. Am. Hist. 463, 463-493,
471,487 (Sept. 1995).
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tem in any way, and Clark describes some antebellum feminists as
utterly "divorced from law and legal processes,'?
The rejection of legalism also entailed a rejection of legalistic discourse. The language of religious reformers, as Clark reminds us, was
deliberately emotional, as preachers exhorted their listeners to identify imaginatively with the plight of enslaved people, and anti-slavery
literature relied on graphic, vivid imagery of physical abuse to stir
feelings of horror and sympathy in its readers. Evangelical religious
and antislavery rhetoric was anecdotal rather than argumentative,
conversational rather than didactic, and often in the more immediate first-person voice rather than the detached third-person-in
every way, opposed to the "cold, dry legalism of orthodoxy."
The reformers' preference for an affective style of discourse, as
well as their preoccupation with social relationships of sympathy,
developed in a broader culture increasingly attuned to matters of
"personal spirituality" and "moral relations with others," Contemporary romantic and sentimental literature, Clark argues, focused
not on the "classic restraint problems of sovereignty, but rather the
problems of perception and connection, for which law is useless
but intuition is kev," Here Clark is most directly writing about the
changing nature of authority in early nineteenth-century American
culture, but she also seems to be making a point about how reformers perceived the broader problems of social ordering. For abolitionists and other religious reformers, slaveholding and orthodox
Protestantism alike were corrupt institutions sustained by soulless
legal formulas, which could be rehabilitated (or eliminated, in the
case of slavery), only by hearkening to the cries of individual conscience, which supplied not only a supra-legal moral judgment but
also the impetus to act upon that judgment."
Surely Clark is correct in emphasizing the unique epistemelogical
loyalties of religious reformers, and in drawing a sharp contrast between law and intuition as alternate means of constructing a worldview in nineteenth-century America . And drawing this contrast is
an important component of the larger argument which weaves
2 Elizabeth B. Clark, Anticlericalism and Antistatism 1-2, 3, 38, 41, 42-43 (unpublished ms. 1995) (copy on file with Elizabeth B. Clark Papers, Boston University Law
School); Elizabeth B. Clark, Religion, Rights, and Difference in the Early Women's
Rights Movement, 3 Wis. Women's L.J., 29, 33 (1987) .
3

Clark, 82 J. Am . Hist. at 476 .

4

Clark, Anticlericalism at 9, 9-12 .
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its way through all her articles on antebellum reform : the women's
and abolitionist movements were not essentially secular, as many
historians have described them, but rather were rooted in liberal
Protestantism. Clark's analysis consistently distinguishes religiousminded reformers from the hidebound institutions of church and
state, emphasizing the reformers' evangelical and sentimental ideology, vividly emotional and persuasive discourse, distrust of excessive state power, and antipathy towards clerical authority and
hierarchies. The secular state and ecclesiastical institutions, meanwhile, were typified by a legalistic adherence to precedence and
procedure, a secular and rational discourse, an emphasis on argument over analogy or sympathy, an individualistic conception of
rights, and an inherently masculine character."
The distinctions between liberal Protestantism and law, distinc tions that were profoundly gendered, were paralleled in differences
between the private and public rhetoric of antebellum religious reformers. The 1848 Seneca Falls Convention's Declaration of Sentiments, for example, is famous for its evocation of the language of
the Declaration of Independence . We now know from Clark's work
that the Declaration of Sentiments was less a direct reflection of the
philosophy of most women reformers than a conscious adaptation
designedto appealto constitutionally-minded men. Forthese women,
rights came from God, not from government, and existed not as a
guarantor of individual liberty but as a means to achieve divinelyintended self-expression, an infinitely more radical and potentially
socially transformative vision of rights and government: "Rights
claims for antebellum feminists were not in the nature of strict bids
for inclusion in a grant of powers and protections from human government. Rather, they expressed the terms on which individuals
could best live out God's designs for human happiness." Yet, save
perhaps for a few passages, this is not how the Declaration of Sentiments reads."
Clark perceivesthe stark contrasts between reformers' public and
private communications, both in content and in style, astantamount
to "two distinct languages," indicating that "women themselves
S " M asculinit y" in this context was typified by the drinking and swearing practiced by members of the legal profession. Clark, 3 Wis. Women's l.J ., at 38-41.

6 Clark, 3 Wis. Women's l.J. at 46; The Declaration ofSentiments, in Early American Women : A Documentary History, 1600-1900, at 242-243 (Nancy Woloch ed.,
2nd ed., McGraw-Hili 2002).
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identified their values and politics as in some way separate from
men's. " And indeed, the "gender-based legal critique" of some reform periodicals so fiercely attacked the legitimacy of manmade
law that it applauded extra-legal violence in furtherance of reform
goals, such as the woman who horsewhipped a bartender in the
name of temperance.' Such drastic measures were necessary in the
eyes of reformers, Clark explains, because the law and legal institutions were so utterly unresponsive to the moral claims of women.
The anti-legal stance of many female reformers, notwithstanding
their goal of gender equality, was firmly rooted in a contemporary
ideology of gender difference. Women reformers themselves understood there to be fundamental differences between the sexes,
differences which in no way translated into women's inferior status,
but were central to reformers' conceptions of social evils and their
necessary correctives." Thus, law was a tool of men, while women,
utterly "divorced from law and legal processes," sought to "promote
moral sentiments."9
The broad dichotomy Clark establishes between liberal Protestantism and law in early nineteenth-century America serves not only
to clarify her point about the religious background, philosophy, and
goals of the reformers, a novel and important argument in itself, but
Iso to bolster her critique of Elizabeth CadyStanton for her post-Civil
War shift toward the side of legal orthodoxy in her worldview and
political strategy. Stanton's later focus on individual autonomy, Clark
argues, led her to reject greater state involvement in domestic relations, thereby limiting the achievements of liberal fernlnisrn .'? In
Clark's recounting, then, Stanton's career was a model in disilluClark, 3 Wis. Women 's L.J . at 44,40-41.
Here Clark parts company from Ellen DuBois and other historians who would
exclude difference-minded reformers from the genealogy of true, equality -minded
feminism . Most of these early women reformers did not believe they had to be
identical to men in order to merit equal civic and political status; in fact, the ir ostensibly superior moral characters actually endowed with them superior qualifications for participation in pol itics and governance. See, e.q., See Ellen Carol
DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage,
and the United States Constitution, 74 J. Am. Hist. 836, 843, 856-57 (1987).
9 Clark, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. at 33, 32.
7

8

10 Elizabeth B. Clark, Self-Ownership and the Political Theory of Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, 21 Conn. L. Rev. 905, passim, esp. 924 (1988-89); Clark, Matrimonial
Bonds: Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth-Century America, 8 L. & Hist. Rev. 25,

passim, esp. 49 (Spring 1990).
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sioned and misguided retrenchment, a regrettable abandonment
of the reformers' moralistic and sympathetic culture for the perceived practicality of liberal individualism.
In order to characterize Stanton as having gone to the dark side,
however, and in order to maintain her focus on the essentially religious orientation of early nineteenth-century women reformers,
Clark needs to maintain a clear picture of distinct "sides," to contrast
clearly the world of the spiritual and sympathetic from the world
of the rational and legalistic. Yet these two spheres may not have
been as impermeable as she at times seems to suggest. Despite
their disdain for legalism as a worldview, and their distrust of the
law as a mechanism for effecting social change, religious women
reformers nonetheless did attempt to achieve legal reforms, and
they were certainly capable of adopting legalistic language when it
suited their purposes to do so; the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments
is only one example of this sort of translation. Thesewomen, whose
private communications were suffused with religious imagery and
animated by broad, morality-based arguments, corseted their otherwise radical public pronouncements and appeals to male lawmakers into the reassuringly familiar mode of liberal ideology, with its
strict focus on the political and legal rights of the individual.
Moreover, the two spheres of evangelical reformers and legal
actors were hardly mutually exclusive in terms of their discourse.
Even the most heartwrenching depictions of the abuse of slaves
were presented according to "scrupulous standards of proof," relying on "firsthand testimony" not only to stir readers' emotions
but also to "[avoid] hearsay." One gets the impression that for all
their evangelical fervor, antislavery advocates were also highly conscious of meeting legal standards of proof; Clark quotes Theodore
Weld and the Grimkes asserting that "'Facts and testimonies are
troops, weapons and victory, all in one.'''ll And one advocate for
the moral supremacy of private judgment over manmade laws and
institutions argued, "This necessity of answering for himself at the
bar of God, obliges every man to act an independent part."'12 It
is telling that in describing an individual's relationship with God,
"unmediated by civil or ecclesiastical authorities," the abolitionist
quoted here nonetheless resorted to a legalistic metaphor, cloaking
11 Clark,
12

82 J. Am. Hist. at 467-68 (citations omitted).

Clark, Anticlericalism at 12 (citations omitted).
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the divine in judicial robes and casting the good Christian as a court room defendant (or, perhaps, an attorney)." These examples are
not culled from appeals to male lawmakers, but from texts largely
intended for the reform community itself; it seems unlikely that
these legal standards and metaphors were consciously deployed as
a rhetorical strategy. Rather, these authors reflexively chose language which resonated with them and their readers. Throughout
these essays, Clark rightly insists that we take these women reformers at their word, and listen carefully to how they described their
objectives and themselves. But if the "language women spoke
among themselves" both manifested and manufactured the unique
culture of early nineteenth-century female reform movements,
then we need to grapple with the fact that so much of this language
was in fact legalistlc."
Notwithstanding their philosophical and moral objections to legalism and the legal system, religious reformers still inhabited a
world in which legal standards were the sine qua non of proof, and
legal metaphors had the most evocative associations with fairness
and justice. Just as women reformers, however radical, were nonetheless acting within a cultural context in which significant differences between the sexes were largely unquestioned as both natural
and desirable, they were also acting within a cultural context that
embraced law and legal forms as some of the most legitimate expressions of community values, and legal standards (e.g., of proof,
of evidence) as important guarantors of rights and liberties. And
just as they could not fail to be inf luenced by prevailing gender
norms, nor could they ever wholly escapecontemporary valuations
of the law, as a symbol or metaphor as much as an institution.
But in order to understand fully the significance of writing in legalistic metaphors, we would have to know more about the legal
culture of early nineteenth-century America. For while the religious
ideology of antebellum reformers certainly conditioned the ways
in which they thought about law, its usefulness as a tool of reform,
and their relationship to it , their views were just as certainly informed by contemporary legal culture, the "values and attitudes
which bind the [legal] system together, and which determine the

13

14

Clark, Anticlericalism at 11.
Clark, 3 Wis. Women's LJ. at 43 .
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place of the legal system in the culture of the society as a whole."ls
Many women reformers perceived American legal and political culture as thoroughly masculine, in the worst sense of the word, populated by rum-swilling, brawling, and profanely swearing judges and
legislators." But while the outspoken critique of masculine legal
culture may have been new, the very identification of the law with
masculine values and activities was not. In eighteenth-century Connecticut, for example, ascolonial civil courts adopted more technical
legal procedures and focused their business on extra-local economic
relationships, women became lessand less likely to appear in court.
And in criminal courts, men tended to speak in legalistic language,
while women spoke in more religious terms." Women's "[divorce]
from law and legal processes," like most painful breakups, had a
long history of alienation and miscommunication, after all, and it
would be easier to understand the final dissolution, not to mention
the later reconciliation, if we had some sense of this history.
Complicating the dichotomy Clark sets up between religious reformers and secular legalists in this way returns us to our original
question. Given abolitionists' antipathy for legalism on both philosophical and stylistic grounds, how did these keepers of the flame
of liberal political theory convert their notions of individual rights
into legal reality? Clark occasionally hints at the mechanism by
which affective, emotional rhetoric penetrated the dry discourse of
legal institutions, as when she suggests that "The spare liberal
notion of bodily autonomy made its way into the courts cloaked in
sentimental garb," or that " narrat ives of suffering .. . shape[d] arguments for legal redress."IB She argues that expanded notions of
"the rights of the person" propounded by abolitionist activists altered social and legal norms, resulting in " broadened definitions of
assault" in the criminal law and contributing to the "slow process
of the constitutionalization of individual rights." The "rhetoric of
sympathy," too, introduced "empathic identification" to American culture, most significantly in making arguments by analogy effective
15

Lawrence Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 L. Socy. Rev. 29,

34 (1969).
16

Clark, 3 Wis . Women's LJ. at 40 .

Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in
Connecticut, 1639-1789, passim (U.N.C. Press, 1995); Dayton, Taking the Trade:
Abortion and Gender Relations in an Eighteenth-Century New England Village , 48
Wm . & Mary Q 19, passim (1991).
17

18

Clark, 82 J. Am . Hist. at 486 , 486 n. 58 .
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in constitutional jurisprudence for the first time." And as the reformers' vigorous anticlericalism expanded to undermine all forms
of discretionary authority and hierarchical status relationships it
contributed to liberalism's "theory of limited state power.">
But this is the extent of what we are told about how the extralegal-if not downright anti-legal-ideologies of antebellum religious reformers eventually became legal ideologies, and even legal
realities, themselves. This is not to suggest that Clark should have
undertaken a detailed analysis of how reformists' philosophical
principles migrated into legal standards, procedures, and institutions; this is not her central project." And it is not to question the
premise that sentimental language can effect cultural shifts result ing in legal change; we have to look no further than the recent success of the religious right in shaping public opinion in this country
on a whole range of social issues, notably abortion and gay marriage, to see the power of emotional rhetoric. However, it would
be helpful to hear more about the political strategy that directed
avowed anti-legalists to seek change through the law, and the cultural shifts that primed ostensibly orthodox judges and legislators
to accept sympathetic and sentimental arguments for legal change.
Clark does tell us that beginning in the 1850s, women reformers
began to accept legal and political means of reform, and increasingly sought change through legislative and judicial action rather
than through moral suasion. The immediate efficacy of anti-liquor
legislation trumped many women's philosophical preference for
achieving individual and social reform through persuasion and conversion, and endowed the formerly secondary goal of suffrage with
new significance. This new "emphasis on legal rights, narrowly conceived," Clark argues, "diminished discussions of economic and social entitlement." But even these new claims for legal rights were
premised upon older, gendered ideas about women's obligations
to their families and communities, not necessarily their civil rights
as autonomous individuals ."
19

Clark, 82 J. Am . Hist. at 492.

20

Clark, Anticlericalism at 36.

For an example of such an approach, see Barbara S. Shapiro, " Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American
Law of Evidence, passim (U. Cal. Press, 1991) and Shapiro, Probability and Certainty
in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationsh ip between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature, passim (Princeton U. Press, 1983) .
21

22

Clark, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. at 56.
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Given what Clark has told us about reformers' earlier opposition
to legal institutions and orthodoxies, it is unsurprising that they did
not plunge with abandon into a more secular, rights-oriented discourse. The philosophical and discursive shifts Clark describes are
more uncertain, subtle, and complex-which makes one wish she
would have had the time to explore them more fully. Important
questions remain : did the early nineteenth-century reform movements and their fervent religious discourse mark an isolated moment, a deviation from secular liberal individualism between the
first two great eras of constitutional change, the founding era itself
and the post-Civil War Amendments? That is, did liberal religious
thought interrupt a tradition of secular rational conceptualization
of individual rights, or was it actually an important element of that
tradition? How does our answer to this question shape our understanding of the intent and meaning of the Emancipation Proclamation? And if sympathy and sentimentality eventually penetrated
jurisprudential reasoning and discourse, did they survive in evangelical or in humanistic form-just what is this "persistent strand
in our rights tradition"?"
We might wish for more from Clark herself, but with her many
important insights, her quietly understated revelations, and the
dense network of ideas within her own discourse, she has left
future historians-of women, of politics, and of the law, for startersample foundation for further thought and research. Her elaboration
of the religious strains in antebellum political theory provides a
richer context for scholars who seek the full measure of Lincolnno stranger to the rhetoric of religious reformers himself-and his
Emancipation Proclamation. The mid-century changes in legal discourse that she so matter-of-factly observes are in themselves
provocative phenomena for scholars of legal language and culture,
and the conversion of lawmakers and judges from orthodox legal
analysis to sympathetic reasoning should be further explored by
legal historians. Elizabeth Clark was able to leave us, however, a
new and deeper appreciation for the crucial role played by antebellum women reformers in shaping and preserving the cultural,
political, and constitutional history of individual rights in America.

23

Clark, 82 J. Am . Hist . at 487.

{Elizabeth Clark—A comment*
Carol Weisbrod, Law School, University of Connecticut
*This comment was written in 2004 as a contribution to a book which was not published.
The piece was slightly revised in 2019.

“Like many late-Victorian intellectuals who suffered breakdowns—William
James, Max Weber, Abraham Kuyper—Royce left his wife and children behind and took
a curative holiday alone.” 1 The list of names—leaving aside the behavior—seems
strange. Of the four men, two and possibly three are known and even well known in the
world of American historians. The Dutch theologian-statesman Abraham Kuyper is quite
possibly not known at all, at least to those outside the fields of religious or modern
European history. We are not surprised to find such a list in the work of those
associated with a religious tradition—the author is in fact Ronald Wells, of the history
department at Calvin College. And we would not be surprised to find such a list in a
work by Betsy Clark.
This comment discusses two ways in which Betsy Clark’s work is out of the
ordinary. The first relates to the way in which she read texts, and the kinds of things she
read. The second relates to the particular concerns she brought to the essays in the
unfinished book she called, Women, Church, and State.
I.

1
Ronald A. Wells, Foreword to JOSIAH ROYCE, CALIFORNIA: FROM THE CONQUEST IN 1846 TO THE
SECOND VIGILANCE COMMITTEE IN SAN FRANCISCO [1856] A STUDY OF AMERICAN CHARACTER, at xx-xxi (2002).

1

As to her reading, one can comment both on the manner of the reading and the
subjects of it.
Betsy Clark fit things together in ways that, while not unique to her, made her
highly unusual in her professional context. Her extraordinary intellectual strength was
the ability to project herself into the minds of those who lived in another time and who
thought in other categories. To a notable degree, she was able to go beyond
conventional approaches, particularly approaches relating to religion, and reach the
historical connections which are understood now to be a major contribution of her
scholarship.
Betsy Clark stands outside of law and looks at it. But where is she standing when
she does that? She was a historian who taught on a law faculty. Religion, religious
thinking, literature, law, and culture were not things apart, separated by disciplinary
boundaries, but were integrated in her general historical discussions. Is she, then,
standing on the platform of history? Law? Something else?
If we were to say that it is from history she looked at law, we might have
expected her to look through the optics on law provided by major contemporary
historians. But Betsy Clark was not doing that. She read Stanton, or Willard, for
example, and wanted to know how they saw law and rights. If they read Stephen Pearl
Andrews or Charles Fourier, then she would also. Writing about religion, she only briefly
engaged the familiar historical arguments over the history of church and state. Rather,
she tried to reconstruct the role of religion, and the relation of religion and law as it
seemed to exist in the heads of the specific people she wrote about. One concludes that
2

she was trying to stand not where her discipline placed her, looking at law, but where
her individual human subject placed her. As Steven Wilf suggested to me, we may want
to describe her method in terms of the goals of a figure like Wilhem Dilthey—
emphasizing the need for understanding of the cultural, immersion in the details of
social environment, stressing the need for understanding (as distinct from mere
knowing), and of empathy.
At times, Betsy Clark saw herself as writing history, unmodified. When she
comments that her approach to evangelical and liberal Protestantism may seem like
“egregious lumping”,2 she writes as a part of a profession which might consider
inappropriate joining egregious. It is as one writing history that she rejected
“monocausal history.”3 At other times, there is a quality of normativity in her writing
which places her closer to law. Sometimes the normative shows up in a footnote, as
when she writes that “[w]hatever Foucault thinks about voluntary pain,” her position, “is
that, until invited, not beating people is better than beating people.”4 But this kind of
personal footnote is not the only thing that seems beyond the familiar historical
discourse. Rather, it is the apparent need to pass on the substantive question. When
she discusses the feminist orientation of various historians, Betsy Clark does not seem
to be engaged in a discussion of historiography. Rather, she seems to be seriously
concerned about something else: which version is the truest to feminism. As Aviam

2

Elizabeth B. Clark, The Sacred Rights of the Weak: Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights
in Antebellum America, 82 J. OF AM. HIST. 463, 464 (1995).
3
Elizabeth B. Clark, Self-Ownership and the Political Theory of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 21 Conn. L. Rev.
905, 940, n.154.
4
Clark, supra note 2, at 492, n.74.

3

Soifer points out, in general, she “was committed on an ongoing basis to the
unrealizable search for justice.” And he adds, “[t]his commitment drew her passionately,
yet critically, to other seekers … to protesters who sought the reformation of status
relationships across the centuries; and to those who used and abused the metaphor of
suffering as they crusaded against slavery and other forms of oppression.”5
These actual political concerns—they motivated her often, as is plain from the
memorial tributes in Boston University Law Review—give Betsy Clark’s work a sound
which is entirely distinctive. In the footnotes and asides, one hears her voice as an
individual, as specific to her as her image of Elizabeth Cady Stanton: a “majestic,
solitary figure … sailing through the universe with a star in one hand and a ballot in the
other.”6
The normative sound suggests that she perhaps came closer to the approach of
what we now call law and culture than the approach of law and history.7 If law/culture is
distinguished by its relatively new emphasis on films, we can link Betsy Clark to that
approach through her citation of Woody Allen. If the idea is a connection to the general
culture, we can refer to her sense that she was, in her late piece on Frances Willard,
pursuing the method of Jackson Pollock and just getting the material down on paper. Or
we can cite the pictures she used to illustrate the discussion in Journal of American
History. And if these tests are too narrow—as they probably are—we can define

5

Aviam Soifer, Memorial Tribute for Professor Elizabeth B. Clark, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 244, 245 (1998).
Elizabeth B. Clark, Religion, Rights, and Difference in the Early Woman’s Rights Movement, 3 Wis.
Women’s L.J. 29, 52 n.105 (1987).
7
See generally, LAW IN THE DOMAIN OF CULTURE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
6

4

law/culture as an inquiry directed loosely to law as part of the culture as a whole. Betsy
was expert in the culture. One of Betsy Clark’s articles includes an unannotated
parenthetical reference to a man who refused an offer of Graham bread, “saying that he
had noted that when you began with Graham bread, you ended with infidelity.”8 The law
journals would probably have insisted on a source. Had Betsy Clark finished the work,
she might have identified the source. But as it is, this is a posthumously published
essay, edited by others. As it stands, the unapologetic absence of the specific source—
she seems to know from her own direct experience—seems to show how deeply Clark
had absorbed the culture she was describing.
Of the range of questions historians approach—why something happened when
it did or why something did not happen at all—Betsy Clark seems to have focused
particularly on one: What did people mean by the words they used and how did those
meanings relate to the professional legal understandings of those same words? She
was concerned about the role of the state and the development of the state, but did not
limit her inquiry to the official understandings and the official texts. Her sense of what
was important in the rights discussion was different from the central legal and political
narratives evidencing the development of rights arguments. She read what others have
read but perhaps read those materials differently. She clearly read things that other
people often do not read at all.
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Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).
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One can imagine that, had she lived to carry her work forward, Betsy Clark would
have continued to work along the same lines. An anecdote about Jane Addams might
have caught her attention. The story comes from Chicago in l903. It was midnight, and
horses had been injured but not killed in a fire. Firemen in Chicago were supposed to
ask judges for permission to shoot horses within the city limits. They could not find a
judge and would have to wait until morning to relieve the suffering of the horses. They
went to Jane Addams for permission to shoot the horses. She said, “I have no legal
authority, but I will take responsibility” and she went to watch the shootings.9 In this
story, the private becomes public (though unofficial) through the fact that it is
acknowledged, established as a kind of authority, recognized by those who submit
themselves to it. Betsy Clark might have found the story interesting, linked as it seems
to be to her inquiry into anti-statism in the 19th century, and her projected work on 20th
century thinking.
Moving forward, Betsy Clark might have looked at the idea of rights, and of the
status of constitutional or canonical texts about rights, as they appear to people in the
general culture who are not professionally concerned with these texts. She might have
commented on Elaine Scarry, talking about the language of the Declaration of
Independence as though she were talking about the language of a poem, stressing
scansion and rhythms.10 Or Philip Roth referring to the Declaration of Independence in
The Dying Animal, treating the language of foundational documents as a support for a
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particular life style.11 Or Umberto Eco playing with the changes in meaning which might
result from the introduction of ellipses.12
And she might have reopened the general question of the relation of religious
institutions and religious belief to the developments of her own time.
II
In 1995, Betsy Clark indicated that the title of her book was to be, Women,
Church and State: Religion and the Culture of Individual Rights in 19th Century America.
The echo of the title of Mathilda Joslyn Gage’s Woman, Church and State cannot have
been unintentional though, of course, we can only speculate about the precise meaning
of the reference. At the very least it is a move away from the “essentialism” of Gage’s
title. For the rest, we don’t know.
Gage herself is cited several times in Betsy Clark’s articles and Gage is
discussed in a 1987 bibliographic essay:
Gage’s masterwork, Woman, Church and State, published in
1893, remains one of the few scholarly investigations of that
three-way relationship, and strikingly prefigures the work of
contemporary feminist theologians like Mary Daly. Gage saw
practices such as celibacy and witch-hunts as part of the
church’s policy to degrade women by perpetuating the image
of a lustful and wicked female sexuality. For Gage, women’s
glory had been in the pre-Christian matriarchal societies;
they had suffered their own Fall in their degradation after the
establishment of Christianity. Equally prescient were Gage’s
descriptions of the psychology of oppression, of women’s
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passivity and inability to exert themselves, their morbid
dependence on men for their identities.13
I think that in adopting a variation of Gage’s title, Betsy might also have offered
an explicit comment on Gage’s view of the question of women and religion. Gage’s view
stressed the repressive aspects of church’s teachings on women and the sinfulness of
women’s work for equality. Clark advanced a reading by women of religious materials
which saw different possibilities. One might say that Betsy Clark’s work on the question
of religion and women, religion and women’s rights, was an implicit comment on Gage’s
view, a response to someone with whom one was in conversation, as if to say, but
perhaps there is more to be said.
As noted earlier, Betsy Clark did not write much directly on church and state. She
was clear that separation meant more than disestablishment (noting the long process of
legal and cultural change). She also thought that, while the vitality of the church might
have been reduced, issues of church control in the 19th century were still real. Her
conclusion is a mid-point:
It is questionable whether either patriarchy or the church
ruled as forcefully by Stanton’s day as she suggests, or
whether she was beating a dead horse. I think she was
beating a sick horse. Both pure patriarchy and pure
Calvinism were already well in decline by the mid-nineteenth
century, with Stanton enthusiastically preparing to pound in
the coffin nails.14
There is little on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the standard
cases, 19th and 20th century, which are thought to constitute the canon in the field of
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church and state. Instead, Betsy turned her lens on what might today be called religion
and law, broadly understood. (Thus we have two specialized law journals, the Journal of
Religion and Law and the Journal of Church and State, reflecting this difference.) One
can perhaps state, or overstate, the point this way: Church and State focuses on the
connections between religion and the State, and often deals with a familiar range of
questions concerning Supreme Court litigation over the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Religion and Law is more interdisciplinary in its focus, discussing broader
questions of the religious and moral dimensions of law and the human condition. One
can imagine that someone with Betsy’s particularizing approaches would be more
sympathetic to the field of law and religion. But there seems to be no way to entirely
ignore the structural issues which are central to the field called “church and state."
There is a piece of Gage’s history which might have intrigued someone with
Betsy’s range of interests as she carried the story of 19th century feminism forward into
the 20th century. Mathilda Joslyn Gage became a theosophist. Suddenly we are not
talking about mainstream Protestantism or even familiar evangelicals. We are at the
fringe of religious movements, talking about the new religions Betsy Clark dealt with in
her earliest writing on women and religion.15 We also, through the figure of Gage’s sonin-law, Frank Baum, are at the center of popular culture through the familiar images of
Baum’s Wizard of Oz. Baum himself was well known as a creator of department store
windows, a man deeply involved in the new consumer culture.16 His book is analyzed as
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social and political commentary in various ways. Many things might have come
together, not the least being on the point that Oz, great and powerful, is a small man
pulling strings behind a screen, unmasked by a young woman. Betsy Clark, writing on
this, would have been worth reading.
Betsy's work leads us to ask about the possible continuing influence of religion,17
in its various manifestations. Gage moved to an orientation we might link to "New Age"
spirituality or figures like Rudolf Steiner. Still other groups consider religion and religious
tradition and the political world in a more structured way. Betsy herself lived in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, a 19th century home of liberal Christianity. She could have
seen a world that Charles Peirce had seen some time earlier, when he invoked the
Gothic cathedrals. Peirce wrote: “One feels that the men who did these works did really
believe in religion as we believe in nothing.”18 But then, in her concern with cultural
materials she might have also seen some other things. Betsy Clark might have been
struck with the resurgence of Christian apocalyptic thinking that sold millions of copies
of Hal Lindsay’s Late Great Planet Earth in the 1970's and is marked by the success of
the Left Behind series. And beyond the millennial concerns of large numbers of
evangelical Christians, she would have observed many others who are interested in the
questions of Gnosticism reopened to general audiences by the work of Elaine Pagels.
Thinking more generally about America, Betsy Clark would have remembered that the
United States has had often had higher church attendance records than Europe. Her

On her Christianity, see William Park’s memorial comment in 78 B.U. L. REV. 242 (1998).
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17
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historical focus might have suggested parallels with earlier times. For example, many
medieval writers lived with a sense of the imminent return of the Messiah:
[M]any medieval authors believed that the prophecies of the
Apocalypse and other visionary works were being fulfilled in
the present, that the scriptural warnings were given so that
Christians could prepare for the persecution that doctrine
taught was imminent, and that it was imperative that they
speak out with prophetic fervor condemning contemporary
evils.19
I do not speculate on how she would have discussed these dimensions of our culture, or
what literature she would have engaged on religion, on Christianity and on
Evangelicalism20. If Betsy Clark had looked at the contemporary questions—when these
issues are not marginal and are widely discussed—we can be certain that she would
have suggested illuminating differentiations between the various positions staked out.
Questions of religion, state, citizenship, and individual obligation presently engage us
.These were issues which Betsy Clark cared about and deeply understood.
###
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Rights and Relationships from Nineteenth-Century Feminism to Twenty-First-Century
International Human Rights:
An Essay in Honor of Elizabeth Batelle Clark∗
Martha Minow
Harvard Law School

Ideas about rights have inspired revolutions in politics and in homes; ideas about rights animate
grassroots social movements and campaigns to hold governments accountable for their abuse
and neglect of individuals and groups. Yet rights also inspire vivid critiques. Condemned as
hopelessly abstract, incapable of generating adequate remedies, diverting political action into
passive postures before courts, impotent in the face of private rather than governmental
power, or mistakenly portraying people as isolated, self-determining individuals, 1 the idea of
rights emerges both more battered and more ambiguous than their symbolic significance would
suggest. Political theorists and lawyers have much to learn from historians who see rights as
repositories of specific human aspirations and human actions, inflected by particular times and
struggles, even as the language of rights becomes a basis for analogies and transformed
meanings in new contexts. Indeed, unless we are aware of the historical context generating
rights claims and rights consciousness, we risk misunderstanding or distorting their potential for
strengthening human relationships and advancing social justice.
In this light, the unfinished work of historian Elizabeth Battelle Clark is particularly tantalizing.
Rejecting the claim that nineteenth-century American women activists simply revived and
reinterpreted the secular liberal rights consciousness of the nation’s Founders, Clark examined
the religious roots in two competing strands of nineteenth-century feminism. For modem
secular readers, ignorant of the religious subtext of the nineteenth- century arguments, Clark
performed a task rather like a musicologist who recognized musical notation alongside lyrics
otherwise read simply as words. Clark found religious dimensions in not only the evangelical
reformers but also the arguments of the liberal feminists and unearthed commonalties across
camps usually understood as rivals. In so doing, she identified intellectual resources for a
conception of rights expressive of human bonds and capable of advancing social and economic
justice rather than solely individual autonomy.
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She did not neglect difficulties in working out such a concept of rights. Those difficulties
included the risk of state-backed coercion of individuals, biased views about the good that could
oppress members of relatively powerless groups, and simple inability to attract sufficient
political and legal support to achieve implementation. Yet even with these difficulties, rights
claims become rich with current possibilities when they are relocated within the religious and
political context of the nineteenth- century.
Clark acknowledged the differences between liberal and evangelical feminists and their liberal
and evangelical forebears in the struggles to abolish slavery. Nonetheless, she found within all
of them traces of the critique of Calvinism washing across Protestantism in America during the
early 1800s. 2 If Christian theology had once treated pain and suffering as ordained by a
judgmental God and inevitable given original sin, limited salvation, and the glorification of
Christ’s own suffering, newer Christian views of a benevolent God cultivated human sympathy
for the bodily suffering of others. Antislavery activists built on these views to attack the
suffering inflicted on slaves who no less than any other humans inhabited bodies created by a
benevolent God. 3
Abolitionists summoned a notion of rights growing from the fact of human embodiment within
a divine creation. Evangelicals in particular cultivated moral reasoning from sympathy, mirroring
the warm bond between an individual and a loving God. Abolitionists joined in urging a right to
self-ownership as fundamental to all other rights. Indeed, in the wake of liberal Protestantism,
doing good as a matter of conscience was the path that should inspire relationships of respect
and grounds for criticizing abusive relationships.4
Clark argues that by stressing self-ownership, abolitionists meant to root a collection of rights
addressing the wants and needs of a physical body. She described “the right to freedom of
movement, the right to marry and establish domestic relations; the right of a female slave to
refuse sexual relations with white men; and the right of a slave to be free of physical abuse or
coercion imposed by masters or other quasi officials without due process of law,” as well as a
right to be free of coercion for any who respect the rights of others.5 A right to self-ownership
became central. Yet the connotation of solitary autonomy associated with that term today
misses how it was infused with Christian conceptions of the path toward enlightenment.
Accordingly, this right also implied the struggle for conscience and duty.6
2
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As feminists drew upon abolitionist ideas, they emphasized an analogy between abused or
abandoned wives and the image of the suffering slave. They also extended the arguments
against bodily coercion. For both liberal reformers exemplified by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and
evangelical activists, illustrated by Frances Willard and the Women’s Christian Temperance
Union, the human body became the touchstone for rights. The body could suffer. The body was
divinely made. With a focus on the body that could suffer, feminists, like abolitionists, sought to
cultivate empathy for the suffering of others. By emphasizing the divine origin of all humans,
the feminists sought a kind of universality that also acknowledged differences. According to
Clark, the feminists also meant to invoke the religious sensibility that “stressed the
interconnections between rights and responsibilities, between civil and domestic relations, and
between the workings of the state and the home.” 7 Rights would represent ways of envisioning
new social relationships, linked to responsibilities; rights would function within the context of a
set of reciprocal obligations, with freedom dependent upon restraints and freedom even found
in being bound to others. 8 Clark cites Jane Croly who viewed the interdependence of human
beings as mirroring the interdependence of parts of one body. 9
This conception seems especially promising to those who are moved by the critique of liberal
rights, charged with tending to neglect or suppress human relationships of interdependence
and need. These critiques have gained steam since the 1970s and reflect both a second wave of
feminism and other intellectual movements, affected by Marxism, the Frankfurt School of
Critical Theory, and communitarianism.10 Critics charged that rights predicated on the solitude
and separateness of each person wrongly imply individual self-sufficiency or deny rights to
anyone who demonstrates vulnerability or dependency. In this light, the nineteenth-century
feminist notions of rights interconnected with responsibilities, mutual regard, and conscience
afford a potential alternative. Indeed, the early feminists thought that individual rights would
protect the community.11
This alternative view is quite different from a notion of group rights: rights afforded to
members of a group by dint of their group affiliation as a protection against intrusion and a
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basis for claiming access to certain goods or privileges. The feminists were interested in people
who could be identified as members of groups—notably, women, and slaves. Yet they sought
rights rooted in each person and each person’s conscience. And they hoped to reconstruct
society to promote the civic competence and personal development of each individual. 12 This
hope is exemplified in the use of the word “woman” rather than “women” in their writings and
even the names of their organizations and activities.
The feminists’ alternative also offers a richer relational emphasis than the gesture toward
relationships in the analytic jurisprudence of figures like Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld emphasized
conceptual rather than sociological or psychological relationships. He wrote that legal rights
have what he called correlatives, etching out relationships between the rights-bearing and
others. Rights accordingly should be viewed as advantages conferred by the state, advantages
that create particular vulnerabilities or restrictions for others.13 If one person has a right,
another has a duty; if one person has a privilege, another has no right; if one person has a
power, another has a liability; and if one person has an immunity, the other has a disability. This
variety was necessary because Hohfeld emphasized that it was a logical error to deduce rights
from liberties, since some liberties carry no correlate duties for others not to interfere, and
policy considerations rather than logic arrange the relationships among rights bearers and
others. 14
Hohfeld’s theory does not reflect the social, religious, and even psychological vision of the
nineteenth-century feminists who would draw on religious conscience rather than policy to etch
patterns of human interdependence to be recognized and supported by legal rights. Yet
Hohfeld posed a challenge that is not fully addressed by the feminist notion of
interdependence. He argued that rights theories cannot express an inherent logic because
rights themselves encompass contradictory principles of freedom of action and security,
resolvable only through ethical and policy debates. 15 The feminists acknowledge conflict but
imagine it to take the form of abuse and coercion.
Clark explains that women writing in the 1850s revealed fears “that in the brave new world of
politics there was no place for the standard of moral accountability which pertained between
relatives, friends, and neighbors, and that the law was not creating any new ethic whereby the
bonds of community, loosely worn but still taut in times of need, could be maintained.” 16
Evangelical women built the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, a vision of informal bonds,
animated by love, and nonconfrontational methods of persuasion to match their opposition to
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force and coercion as means and as ends. 17 Proceeding themselves from a sense of obligation in
their efforts to improve the lives of poor people and prisoners, the feminists hoped others
would do the same.
This created for the women advocates a different sort of difficulty: how could their vision be
translated into a theory of governance; involving the state? Although the feminists sought social
justice, they resisted the kind of coercion represented by government policy power. Clark
explains, “Far from looking to government for remedies and favors, there was a strong
emphasis on self-help and a belief that, by readying themselves and their neighbors, activists
could bring about the desired transformation without seeking direct political change or
soliciting governmental intervention.” 18 Influenced by abolitionist work, the reformers had to
question state power that had enforced slavery. 19 Ideally, they saw charitable work not as
private work but as a public alternative to government. Women’s groups raised money to build
sidewalks, hospitals, and other local services. 20 In these ways, they would avoid the problems
later identified with twentieth-century “governance feminism,” policy initiatives relying on
governmental power.21
The nineteenth-century feminists thought the Golden Rule should be the first principle of
governance: treat others as you would want to be treated. 22 Yet, the Woman’s Christian
Temperance Union (WCTU) women came to want more effectiveness in implementing their
vision. To pursue the idea of “organized mother love,” after the Civil War they did begin to
advocate for state actions and government prohibitions, epitomized by the ban on alcohol.23 By
the turn of the century, the WCTU came to stand for repressive force, using government power
to implement the presumption that some know what is best for all, and using state power to
impose the views of a group of white, upper- and middle-class women on others. Yet its
members began with a different vision: the goal was to resist all coercion and force, and instead
seek mutual aid and local action.
Liberal feminists diverged sharply and embraced instead the individualist version of rights.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s early writings may have been ambiguous, but as time went on she
sharply differed from the evangelical feminists. Notably, after the Civil War, Stanton built upon
abolitionist arguments against positive law and pushed for sharp limits on the power of the
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government.24 The government should at best protect individual liberty. Hence, she called for
divorce in the name of personal liberty. 25 She emphasized personal liberty producing skepticism
of state power, and she objected to using the Golden Rule to guide government by raising
doubt that anyone could really know others well enough to know what they want. 26
Nonetheless, she used the notion of rights to articulate autonomy and self-determination.
Sometimes, you just need the language of rights to say no, to erect a barrier against coercion, to
demand the space to be, to choose, to diverge.
The liberal theory, backed by Stanton, could elaborate individual freedom for these purposes
but could not afford a basis for government action in pursuit of social justice. The evangelical
theory, backed by Willard, could pursue a vision of the collective good but in so doing,
underestimated the malignant and coercive dangers of government action. 27 Is there any
alternative to these two positions?
I think that Clark unearthed resources for an alternative view from the points of connection
among feminists who later diverged: Their shared commitment to the body that can suffer as
the locus of rights, their recognition that selfownership should entail the ability to feed and
care for the body and to develop the self. Cultivating a sense of obligation and creating the
social change they advocated by their own local and collective action, the feminists engaged in
governance even when they bypassed formal government power.
The work of mutual and communal help animated the settlement house movement in the early
twentieth century, and like some of the nineteenth-century feminist local action, generated
some changes in positive law. Many attribute to their work the foundations of the welfare
state.28 Jane Addams, for example, initiated factory inspections as a private citizen of a sort that
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later become mandated by law. But her efforts at Hull House modeled forms of social
relationships, as wealthy college graduates moved to poor immigrant neighborhoods and
participated jointly with local residents in cultural and political activities. Today we might call
this “capacity building.” 29
A more recent but similar effort is the battered women’s movement, which created new private
institutions—shelters—while also successfully agitating for changes in the law and in the
practices of police and judges. Again, a conception of bodily integrity and self-ownership proved
central—but as important were commitments to ensure that women could fulfill their roles as
mothers, protecting their children from abuse, and women could find strength by helping one
another.
Yes, dilemmas and compromises have accompanied the successes of the battered women’s
movement. When shelters receive public dollars, they become more professionalized and
bureaucratic and less characterized by mutual aid. 30 A few commentators have struggled to
articulate a right to a safe relationship rather than simply severing the relationship with an
abuser.31 This idea points toward personal and social transformations unlikely to be achieved by
law. When laws change to protect people from violence in their homes, state power grows, and
that power can be abused or can generate public backlash. 32 Yet advocates can instead work to
Work in the 1890s, in THE SOCIAL SURVEY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1880-1940, 111-47 (Martin Bulmer, et al., eds.,
1991).
29
See, e.g., World Health Organization, Capacity Building and Initiatives,
http://www.who.int/tobacco/control/capacity_building/background/en/.
30
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 95-97 (2000); Elizabeth M. Schneider, et al.,
Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, 10 J. L. & POL’Y. 313, 347 (2002) (discussing the
role of the welfare state, and offering a comparative perspective to the United Kingdom); Mearle H. Weiner, From
Dollars to Sense: A Critique of Government Funding for the Battered Women’s Shelter Movement, 9 LAW & INEQ. 185
(1985).
31
LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY (2006). See generally, Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem
of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 4 (1989); Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly:
Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2 (1999); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving
Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993).
32
Donna K. Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001); Margaret B. Drew & Marilu E. Gresens, Denying Choice of Forum: An Interference by
Massachusetts Trial Court with Domestic Violence Victims’ Rights and Safety, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 293 (2010); Laura
Dugan, et al., Exposure Reduction or Backlash? The Effect of Domestic Violence Resources on Intimate Partner
Homicide. National Criminal Justice Reference Service (2001).
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/186193.pdf (last visited Sep 18, 2017); April L. Girard, Backlash or
Equality? The Influence of Men’s and Women’s Rights Discourses on Domestic Violence Legislation in Ontario, 15
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 5 (2009); Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of
Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 171 (1993); Natalie J. Sokoloff &
Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender: Challenges and Contributions to
Understanding Violence Against Marginalized Women in Diverse Communities, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 38
(2005) (arguing for a more intersectional approach to legal regimes addressing domestic violence); 209A
Restraining Orders Can Be Abused, Lynch & Owens (2017), https://lynchowens.com/209a-restraining-orders-can-

raise consciousness, and build informal and formal relationships and institutions on the ground
and in tune with people's expectations and demands. This has been a guiding approach in the
battered women’s movement, which seeks in large part to promote changes in people and their
relationships, rather like the nineteenth-century feminists’ efforts to build on liberal
Protestantism's invitation to change human relationships. 33
The contemporary international human rights movement also expresses similar themes. For
international human rights around the world, advocates have stressed the crucial importance of
nongovernmental, often grassroots action; the centrality of consciousness-raising in remaking
norms, institutions, and practices; and the affirmation of these changes in formal legal
documents, created to confirm the changes in mindset already underway. 34 That contemporary
international human rights work addresses social and economic rights as much as political and
civil rights mirrors the nineteenth-century feminists’ effort to resist the division between
negative and positive liberties. Lacking a global government, these approaches may be
inevitable for international human rights. Networks bridging governmental and
nongovernmental actors, and efforts to secure national endorsement and to design
international institutions respecting the role of nongovernmental actors, have characterized
international human rights development.
The nineteenth-century feminists illustrated the resources enabled by “the powers of the
weak,” mobilizing to create social change in method as well as ultimate vision, and building
upon a mass consciousness change enabled by the reforms of liberal Protestantism. Liberal
conceptions of rights remain important to constrain government power from abuse, even when
it is authorized in the name of doing good. Yet Clark’s work lifts up the implicit commitments to
mutual aid, responsibility, and recognition of the common needs of all humans at work in ideas
of rights. She also demonstrates the significance of social and religious movements in inspiring
people to enact the vision they advocate in their own relationships and local actions.
Clark’s work also teaches that the thinking of nineteenth-century feminists can assist current
efforts to articulate rights as necessarily relational. 35 The earlier thinkers emphasize more than
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current theorists that seeing rights relationally requires seeking mutual accommodation,
recognizing responsibilities, and finding strength and even freedom through bonds with others.
No less is demanded by recognition of each body’s rights. This recognition might hold a deeper
vision for rights than the image of total control over one’s solitary property that animates
individualistic notions. The dilemmas of reconciling individual liberty and security and
benevolent and oppressive state power remain. I wish Elizabeth Clark were here to develop
more fully how she believes these tensions can be addressed, but the challenge now falls to
others. Meanwhile, the connections she so finely drew between religious revision and
transformative social movements offer renewed inspiration.
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